This study analyzes the causes of civil wars in the Congo since independence and investigates how the Congo case fits the model of civil war proposed by Collier and Hoeffler. Five conclusions arise from this case study. First, the level and growth rate of national income increased the risk of war by reducing the cost of organizing rebellions and the government's ability to counteract the rebellions. Second, while regional ethnic dominance served as a basis for mobilization of rebellions, ethnic antagonism was also an obstacle to the expansion of civil wars beyond the province of origin. Third, while natural resource dependence was a significant determinant of civil wars in the DRC, it is the geographic concentration of natural resources and their unequal distribution that made the Congo particularly prone to civil war. Fourth, the government's ability to counteract rebellions depended more on external support than on the government's military and economic capacity. Fifth, discriminatory nationality laws, disruptions in the ethnic balance of the eastern region caused by the influx of Rwandan Hutu refugees in 1994, and shared ethnicity between rebels and neighboring regimes-variables which are not included in the Collier-Hoeffler model-were significant determinants of the outbreak of civil wars in the 1990s.
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Introduction
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has experienced several rebellions and wars since its independence in 1960. These wars share common features while exhibiting important differences with regard to their causes. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the causes of eight wars in the Congo and to investigate how the Congo case fits the core Collier-Hoeffler model of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 1998 . 1 Five conclusions arise from this case study. First, the level and growth rate of income reduced the cost of organizing rebellions and, to a limited extent, the government's ability to counteract the rebellions. Second, while regional ethnic dominance served as a basis for mobilization of civil wars, ethnic antagonism was also an obstacle to the expansion of these wars beyond the province of origin. Third, while natural resource dependence, as predicted by the Collier-Hoeffler model, was a significant determinant of civil wars in the DRC, it is not dependence per se that motivated the conflicts, but rather the geographic concentration of natural resources and their unequal distribution. Fourth, the government's ability to counteract rebellions depended more on external support than on the government's military and economic capacity. Fifth, discriminatory nationality laws, disruptions in the ethnic balance of the eastern region caused by the influx of Rwandan Hutu refugees in 1994, and shared ethnicity between rebels and neighboring regimes-variables which are not included in the Collier-Hoeffler model-were significant determinants of the outbreak of civil wars in the 1990s.
We organize the study as follows. The next section analyzes eight civil wars that occurred in the DRC since 1960. Section 3 examines the performance of the Collier-Hoeffler model in predicting the Congo's wars and distinguishes cases that fit the model from those that remain puzzles to be explained. 2 Section 4 draws conclusions based on these findings. We conclude that some factors in the Collier-Hoeffler model are important in explaining wars in the Congo, while a number of critical determinants of the timing and location of rebellions are missing from the model.
The wars in the Congo since 1960
The main features of the eight wars discussed in this section are summarized in Table 1 . Below, we provide an analysis of the context and the causes of these wars. Table A1 in the appendix). However, only seven percent of these (2,310 out of 31,847) could be regarded as genuine settlers, the rest consisted of temporarily employed civil servants, industrialists, technicians, and missionaries (Lemarchand 1964: 233-234) .
The Katanga secession war: 11
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The province is the sole producer of copper (70 percent of national production) and cobalt. At independence, Katanga accounted for 75 percent of the Congo's mineral output, about 50 percent of total national resources, and roughly 20 percent of the government's total budgetary expenditures.
The province is also the home of the dominant ethnic groups of the Lunda, Baluba of Katanga, and Bayeke, who historically claimed to be unfairly represented in the central government. The other important feature of the province is the early rapid development of a large urban (non-agricultural) wageearning population (36% in 1959, see Table A1 ), which served as a base for political mobilization by leaders of the secessionist movement.
(ii) Ethnic character of political parties in the pre-independence era
The Katangan secession war was influenced by the ethnic character of the political parties that developed in the period leading to independence. The main parties that contested power at independence were polarized along ethnic lines, except for Lumumba's Mouvement National Congolais (Congolese National Movement, MNC), which advocated national unity and transcended ethnic affiliation (Young 1965 
The Kasai secession war: 8 August 1960 -2 February 1962
The secessionist movement in the Kasai has some similarities with that of Until the latter part of 1959, the MNC-Lumumba had kept a neutral stand in the conflict between Lulua and Baluba. However, in a bid to secure majority seats in the Kasai legislative assembly, the MNC-Lumumba entered into an alliance with the Lulua and defeated the MNC-Kalonji (Lemarchand 1964: 209; CRISP 1962) .
Kalonji exploited these local tensions and the chaos in the central government to declare the secession of southern Kasai. The secessionist war was eventually put down in February 1962 by government forces after some 3,000 to 7,000 thousand people were killed. These figures include combat deaths as well as ethnic massacres. parties opened an extraordinary conference that ended on October 3 with the creation of the CNL whose objective was to overthrow the Adoula government and to achieve "total and effective decolonization of the Congo thus far dominated by a coalition of foreign powers" (Vanderlinden, et al. 1980: 124) .
The Kwilu rebellion: 22
(ii) The ideological factor
The leaders of the CNL fled to Brazzaville and formed a cartel of Lumumbistnationalist parties, the most important ones being MNC-Lumumba led by Gbenye and PSA led by Gizenga (Vanderlinden, et al. 1980) . The CNL had a socialist orientation with both pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese leanings. This socialist orientation proved useful in mobilizing the masses against the central government, which was accused of selling out to capitalist interests, but it also prevented the CNL from obtaining foreign assistance. taking a traditional potion that was purported to transform enemy bullets into water (Verhaegen, 1969 Figure 1 and Table 2 ).
In the period following independence, the Congo continued to experience moderate growth as in the pre-independence era. The economic activity was boosted by high copper prices, expansion of mineral production, and the introduction of the first IMF-funded economic stabilization program in July 1967. 1950 1954 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 Source: Penn World Tab les (gdp using chain rule); World Bank Data Base However, the effects of these programs were minimal. Real per capita GDP declined at an annual rate of 1.2% from 1978 to 1988 and inflation continued at an average of 56% per annum (see Table 2 ). 
Starting in
(iii) The 1977 invasion in Shaba
(iv) The 1978 invasion in Shaba
After the first Shaba war, Mobutu embarked on a fierce repression mission in which dozens of military officers were hastily tried and handed various sentences ranging from several years in prison to execution. These decisions caused high political tension.
In this context of political tension and economic distress, the second Shaba invasion was launched on 3 May 1978 by the former Katangan gendarmes. This time the FNLC declared that its aim was less to conquer Shaba than to remove Mobutu from power. The rebels captured the mining town of Kolwezi on 13 May 1978.
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The United States accused the Soviet Union and Cuba of sponsoring the rebellion, but no evidence corroborated the accusation (Young and Turner 1985) . The rest of the country remained relatively calm during the second Shaba war. Mobutu was rescued by a contingent of 700 French troops and 1,700 Belgian soldiers with logistical support from the American Air Force (Young and Turner 1985) .
The Kabila-led rebellion: 17 October 1996 -17 May 1997 (i) The economic context: Economic collapse and Western disengagement
In the second half of the 1970s, the Zairian economy continued to deteriorate following the post-Zairianization crisis. In an attempt to avert total economic chaos, the IMF came to the rescue and concluded a new agreement with Mobutu. The IMF forced him to settle the country's debt arrears to the IMF and to bring the IMF-backed Kengo Wa Dondo into the government as prime minister with a mandate to resume structural adjustment. In a concerted effort to give Mobutu another chance, the United States, Belgium, France, and Germany decided to write off portions of the debts owed by Zaïre.
(ii) The political context
In addition to economic crisis, the Mobutu regime also faced mounting challenges from domestic political opposition. Mobutu's reaction to the opposition's demand for reform was intransigent and violent. In May 1990, when students in Lubumbashi protested against Mobutu's decision to rescind the political reforms announced a month earlier, government troops responded by killing 294 students (Emizet 1997: 44) . This further alienated Mobutu in the eyes of his Western allies. In the same year, both the In an attempt to gather support from "native" Congolese, the Mobutu regime On 16 January 2001, Laurent Kabila was assassinated and his son Joseph Kabila took over the leadership of a country that was partly occupied by rebel troops and foreign forces and suffered from an economy in total chaos. Rwanda and Uganda played a major role in the conflict, directly by the presence of troops on the ground (until they were forced to pull out in 2002), and indirectly by sponsoring specific rebel groups.
(ii) The war and the mineral resource-conflict nexus
The two wars of the 1990s in the Congo, especially the anti-Kabila rebellion, illustrate the intricate relationships between conflict and mineral resources, and the convergence of domestic and international financial interests in perpetuating conflict.
(See Table 3 for details on the main rebel groups involved.) Natural resources provided incentives to fight to capture the resources and helped reduce the constraints in financing war. Once conflict started, various parties derived gains from the conflict through "war economies"; these gains motivated and sustained the continuation of conflict.
Exploitation of mineral resources blurred the distinctions between economic and politicomilitary interests as politically unlikely, but economically rational, alliances formed for lucrative purposes. As a result, ending war became less of a priority.
There are many channels through which rebel organizations have been able to finance and sustain the rebellions. The first mode of financing war is direct taxation whereby the armies and rebel forces extract natural resources using soldiers and forced 
The case of the Congo and the Collier-Hoeffler model
Predictions of the Collier-Hoeffler model for the Congo
Using a sample of 161 countries, Collier and Hoeffler (2002) are robust predictors of the outbreak of civil war: the initial level of income, the growth rate of income, and the share of primary commodity exports in total exports (Collier and Hoeffler 2002: 15) . Grievance factors (ethnic dominance and social fractionalization) are found to play a less important role in predicting civil war. 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 P(war=1) core model alternative model Table 5 presents summary statistics for the regression variables for the DRC and the sample. 13 Except for ethnic dominance, the factors included in the model make the DRC more prone to civil war than the typical country in the sample. The DRC has lower values for per capita income, income growth (except for 1970-74), and peace duration, while it has higher values for the share of primary commodities in total exports, ethnic fractionalization, population, and geographic dispersion of the population, implying a higher risk of civil war.
Among the factors included in the model, income, its growth rate, and dependence on primary commodities play a central role in causing conflict in the Congo.
Low income and low expected economic growth reduce employment and profit expectations, which not only decrease the opportunity cost of joining a rebellion, but also weaken the government's ability to counteract the rebellion.
The dependence on mineral exports makes the DRC prone to conflict due to the struggle for control of resources. The DRC is on the ascending part of the mineral resources dependence curve, below the bliss point of 26% (Collier and Hoeffler 2002: 17) . 14 However, the Collier-Hoeffler model does not account for regional distribution of mineral resources as a mechanism through which mineral resources cause conflict. As discussed in the previous section, it is regional concentration of mineral resources more than resource dependence per se that has made the DRC particularly prone to conflict. Collier-Hoeffler model and the trend of the risk of war while its growth rate worsened from an average of -3.28% to -10.48% per annum. As While economic crisis (captured in the Collier-Hoeffler model by per capita income and its growth rate) created an environment that facilitated the formation of the rebellions, these trigger factors were essential in determining the timing of the onset of rebellions.
The
The role of mineral resources in attracting Ugandan and Rwandan military invasion also explains the higher risk of war in the 1990s. This factor is also not captured in the Collier-Hoeffler model since this is not reflected in the ratio of mineral exports to total exports.
Summary: Wars predicted by the Collier-Hoeffler model and puzzles to be explained (i) The wars of the 1960s
We do not have war probability estimates for the period of the 1960s due to lack of data.
(ii) The wars of the 1970s
The Collier-Hoeffler model correctly and systematically predicts a higher risk of war for the Congo than the average country. The deterioration of economic activity, especially
following Zairianization, which is accounted for in the Collier-Hoeffler model, was a key 30 factor in igniting the rebellions. The struggle for regional control of mineral resources, which is not included in the Collier-Hoeffler model, also played a key role in motivating secessionist movements. A puzzle in this period is that the period 1975-79 has the lowest probability of war in the entire sample period although this period had two wars (the Shaba wars) and was marked by severe economic crisis. The data used in the Collier-Hoeffler model shows a large decrease in the share of primary exports in total exports from 0.140 to 0.078. We find no historical explanation for this decrease. The model would naturally predict a decrease in the risk of war as the share of primary exports decreases.
(iii) The 1980s
The higher probability of war in 1980-85 compared to 1975-79 may be explained by the large decline in income (-5.8% per annum compared to -1.5% in the 1975-79 period; see Table 5 ) as well as the higher share of primary commodities compared to 1975-79.
However, we have no good explanation for the increase in the share of primary commodities in this period. Furthermore, there were no wars in the 1980s. The predictions of the Collier-Hoeffler model for 1980-85 do not seem to be consistent with history.
(iv) The wars of the 1990s
The predictions by the Collier-Hoeffler model of a higher risk of war in the 1990s are consistent with history. The driving factor in the model was the deterioration of economic conditions (proxied by the decline in real per capita income and its growth rate). Coincidentally, the struggle for the control of natural resources by domestic and foreign actors, the manipulation of nationality laws, and the influx of refugees, which are factors not formally included in the Collier-Hoeffler model, also increased the risk of war. Therefore, we can conclude that the Collier-Hoeffler model predicts quite well the wars in the 1990s, even though important factors excluded from the model were critical in igniting the rebellions.
Conclusion
This paper examined the factors that motivated the formation of rebellions, secessionist wars, and civil wars in the Congo since independence. We discussed the predictive power of the Collier and Hoeffler (2002) The level and growth rate of income influenced the risk of conflict, especially through the reduction of the cost of organizing rebellions and also -though to a very limited extent -through the weakening of the government's ability to counteract the rebellions. In the case of the Congo, the government's ability to face the rebellion depended on its external support more than on its own economic capacity.
Natural resource abundance also increased the risk of conflict in the Congo, although the geographic concentration of resources and unequal distribution of wealth provided incentives for secession. The struggle to control mineral resources by domestic and foreign actors also contributed to increasing the risk of war in the 1990s. -1998 -7.8 -0.6 -15.8 (1988-96) -14.7 (1988-96) 3367.6 (1988-97) -6.1 Source: Authors' computation using data from World Development Indicators and World Bank Africa Data Base. The growth rates are computed as the annual compounded growth rates between the beginning and the ending year of each sub-period. The figures for inflation and the fiscal deficit are simple averages of annual values. NA = data not available Table 4 are slightly different from those in Figure 1 . Tables (for the period whereas Table 4 reports data used in the Collier-Hoeffler analysis, that are in 1985 prices from the earlier Penn World Tables (extrapolated for 1989-99). The growth rates of per capita GDP in the two series are very close.
14 The risk of conflict increases as the mineral resources dependence increases up to a threshold (or bliss point) beyond which risk of conflict declines.
